

ADRIAN HAGIU
CONSTANTIN C. LUPAȘCU
SERGIU BORTOȘ

**RELIGION IN OUR DAILY LIVES:
SELF-INTERPRETATION AS A FORM OF
PHILOSOPHICAL COUNSELLING**

Adrian Hagiu

“Alexandru Ioan Cuza” University, Department of Philosophy, Faculty of Philosophy and Social-Political Sciences, Iași, Romania.

Email: adrianhagiu@yahoo.com

Constantin C. Lupașcu

“Alexandru Ioan Cuza” University, Department of Philosophy, Faculty of Philosophy and Social-Political Sciences, Iași, Romania.

Email: c.c.lupascu@gmail.com

Sergiu Bortoș

“Alexandru Ioan Cuza” University, Department of Social Sciences and Humanities, Institute of Interdisciplinary Research, Iași, Romania.

Email: bortos.sergiu@uaic.ro

Abstract: In the present paper we propose a preliminary discussion on the narrative identity underlying the constitution of the self in the thought of the French philosopher Paul Ricœur by relating his hermeneutics of the self to philosophical counseling, which implies the need to discuss the respondent self in the face of sacred texts. The goal of self-understanding and thereby of (self-)counseling is the pursuit of a fulfilled life. Therefore, we provide an outline of how the IPAA method of philosophical counselling can be implemented in relation to religion’s contribution to everyday life. In the light of these objectives, we substantiate the thesis that self-interpretation is in fact self-understanding, and this self-understanding is enhanced by ‘putting’ the self face to face with sacred texts. The main purpose of the present study is to illustrate how the IPAA method can be applied to existential problems, and thus to highlight the following practical implications: (1) a description of the existential or intellectual contribution that sacred texts bring to self-interpretation, and ultimately to self-understanding; (2) an outline of how the IPAA method of philosophical counselling can be practically applied, and this we have done by observing that the role of the philosophical counsellor, when it comes to religious problems, can be readily assumed by a priest, a pastor, and so on, and hence its importance in counselling environments.

Key words: Religion, Philosophical Counselling, Self-Understanding, Self-Interpretation, Everyday Life, Hermeneutics.

1. Introduction

Stephen Hunt (2005, xi) notes that religion is one of the oldest concerns of sociology in terms of the contribution it makes to everyday life. Of course, by religion we must understand the broadest scope of the concept. The Romanian sociologist Nicu Gavriluță (2013, 9) is also of the opinion that a rigorous study of religion must appeal first and foremost to the history of religions. However, beyond establishing scientific benchmarks, it is clear that religion plays an important role in the lives of human beings, especially when it comes to what some have called the “lived religion” (Ammerman 2014, 190). Its “logic” belongs to the practical dimension, while ideas and beliefs are of secondary importance (McGuire 2008, 15). Yet religion, beyond the logic of facts, is above all an instrument that helps guide our lives, as moral conduct. In other words, through religion the self can be continually enriched and honed through obedience, first of all, to sacred texts and only then to rituals and practices.

Therefore, the hypothesis of our paper is that religion in everyday life, translated through philosophical counselling (Frunză, Frunză and Grad 2019), represents the assumption of a good life. At the same time, it must be said that in recent decades philosophical counselling has attracted the attention of researchers through the diversity of its approaches (Hagiu and Bortoş 2022) and the fact that existential problems, which do not require the intervention of psychologists or psychotherapists, can find a solution through it. Therefore, in the present paper, starting from some ideas of the French philosopher Paul Ricœur (1985, 1988, 1999, 2016) on the configuration of the self, we will try to justify the following thesis: the interpretation of the self is in fact self-understanding (Bobb 2015, 46) and this self-understanding is enhanced by “putting” the self face to face with sacred texts, such as the Scriptures. Furthermore, this way of self-understanding according to the IPAA method of philosophical counselling (Hagiu, Bortoş and Tamaş. 2023) is a form of self-counselling, that is, of honing the self in front of the Scriptures or any sacred text. In order to prove the above thesis it is necessary to fulfil the following objectives: (1) a preliminary discussion of the narrative identity which in the French philosopher’s thought entails the constitution of the self; (2) relating Paul Ricœur’s hermeneutics of the self to philosophical counselling, namely, that it is necessary to discuss the self as a responding self in the face of sacred texts; and (3) that the aim of self-understanding and thus of (self-)counselling is the pursuit of a fulfilled life, hence we offer an outline of how the IPAA method can be applied in such a situation.

As for the method by which we propose to support the thesis of this paper, we will approach in a hermeneutical manner the texts of the

French philosopher and we will develop within a phenomenological key the concepts related to the discussion. Naturally, the application of the IPAA method requires a brief discussion of its principles.

2. Narrative Identity and the Self

In the following we will attempt very briefly to shed light on some questions concerning the constitution and honing of the self, starting with some of the ideas outlined by the French philosopher Paul Ricœur. We will proceed as following: (1) First we will discuss the self in Ricœur's philosophy, who deals with some stages of hermeneutics, but not in general, rather with a hermeneutics that becomes at some point ethical. In short, it is a question of moving from the problematic of the self to the problematic of otherness. And the aim of this discussion is therefore "the pursuit of the good life". (2) Secondly, this good life towards which each of us yearns - although it should also be noted that in Ricœur's thought the good life is not very clearly defined - meaning that the good life of the self is influenced by two dimensions of human existence: religion and politics. There is therefore an opportunity to put forward the notion of narrative identity, since the French philosopher has joined the ranks of those thinkers who have staked their hopes on the power of the verb "to narrate" in our lives. It is, of course, a question of a self honed by sacred texts, stories, myths, symbols, and so on. Thus, the issue at hand is to hypothesize that the self is, or allows itself to be honed by the Scriptures - more correctly, by reading them - but, of course, "life" unfolds within a society, in other words, human action, so that the way in which religion intervenes in man's everyday life, emerges in our scheme of things.

Paul Ricœur (1985, 355) first discusses narrative identity at the end of *Temps et Récit III*, where, in order to bring together history and fiction, he assigns to an individual or a community a different identity, a specific identity, which he calls narrative identity. Its role was to answer questions such as "who did such an action?", "who is the agent?", "who is the author?". And to answer the question "who?" is, in a sense, a way of telling the story of a life. A remark is to be made here: what we can call the hermeneutics of the self within Ricœur's thought appears considerably late, but throughout his work the hypothesis of a reflexive nature remains valid. The subject who interprets itself by means of signs is an existent, and by interpreting his own life it discovers that it is seated in being before it is aware that it possesses and develops itself (Ricœur 1999, 14-15). A Romanian commentator sums up this observation as following: "at the heart of Ricœur's philosophy lies the idea that the self must be won only 'in the end', following an effort of going through the mediation of signs, symbols and especially texts, and that this achievement is only possible if

the self is subjected to a radical critique, following the model of the hermeneutics of suspicion and the critique of ideologies” (Bondor 2012, 43).

Finally, going back to the question of narrative identity, the French philosopher writes that self-understanding is an interpretation, and self-interpretation is found in a narrative, among other signs and symbols, as a privileged mediation. This narrative borrows from both history and fiction, making the story of a life a fictional history or, in other words, a historical fiction, in which the historiographical style of biographies and the novelistic style of imaginary autobiographies are interwoven (Ricœur 1988). Of course, this discussion is an extension of the one in *Temps et Récit III*. What is more, Ricœur points out that many problems with identity result from the failure to distinguish between *idem*-identity and *ipse*-identity. The latter are by no means contradictory, but complement each other, and, as we shall see in a moment, narrative identity has the role of bringing them together. Specifically, narrative identity is constituted as a dialectic of the two concepts mentioned above (Ricœur 2016, 157). In short, *idem*-identity comprises three occurrences: (1) numerical identity, which signifies uniqueness; (2) qualitative identity, which signifies extreme similarity; and (3) identity as uninterrupted continuity. However, how can the notion of self, of *ipseity*, of *ipse*-identity intersect with *idem*-identity? *Ipse*-identity or *ipseity*, the French thinker observes, covers the range opened up by pronouns: mine, yours, his, hers, and so on. And the intersection of *idem*-identity and *ipse*-identity is achieved only at a single point: permanence in time. This permanence in time of identity is introduced by Ricœur in order to put an end to the difficulties regarding personal identity that arise from the confusion over it - on which we shall not dwell here. Ultimately, the French philosopher’s response to these disputes was the constitution of narrative identity. Another question: what exactly does this permanence of personal identity consist of? Such a form of permanence in time leaves itself bound to the question “who?” as irreducible to any question “what?”. As such, we can find a form of permanence in time that is an answer to the question: “who am I?”.

In response to the above questions, Ricœur identifies two models of permanence in time: *character* and *the given word*. His hypothesis is that the almost complete envelopment of *ipseity* by the *idem*-identity leads to the sedimentation of the character, and to this sedimentation belongs our sought-after form of permanence in time (Ricœur 2016, 156). For Ricœur, character is a set of distinguishing marks that allow the re-identification of an individual as the same. In other words, the set of enduring dispositions by which a person can be recognized. In short, character (seen as rationally invariable) is the “what” of the “who”. There is, on the other hand, a form of fidelity to the self in keeping one’s word, and this marks the extreme distance between the permanence of the self and that of the *same*.

This problem of the connection between *idem*-identity and *ipse*-identity is fully settled by narrative identity, and Ricœur's argument unfolds in two stages. Briefly, he first shows that, in his extension of the analyses in *Temps et Récit*, the specific pattern of connections between events, formed by the operation of *mise-en-intrigue*, allows us to include in the permanence of time what seems to be its opposite under the auspice of *idem*-identity, namely diversity, variability, discontinuity and instability. Then, the manner in which the notion of *mise-en-intrigue* is transposed from the action to the characters of the narrative produces a dialectic of character that is clearly a dialectic of the fact-of-being-the-same and of ipseity. Thus, identity becomes by convention an identity of the character, and the latter can be understood by applying to the character the operation of *mise-en-intrigue*, which was first applied to the action of the narrative. In short, the character is itself placed into the intrigue (Ricœur 2016, 189). Therefore, narration constructs the identity of the character and this identity we call narrative, which at the same time elaborates the identity of the narrated story. In other words, it is the identity of the story that constitutes the identity of the character. It follows from this that the narrative identity of the character has the function of mediating between the *idem*-identity and the *ipse*-identity. And this function is confirmed by the imaginative variations to which the narrative subjects this identity.

This brief tour de force, it must be said, touches on several aspects of Ricœurian hermeneutics. It is, in fact, a shift from the hermeneutics of historical consciousness to what he called the phenomenology of the capable man. And a clarification is necessary here, of the man capable above all of suffering. The hermeneutics of historical consciousness, Jean Grondin (2013, 83) notes, is configured by Ricœur by touching on three moments: the past - to which tradition is attributed and, therefore, the being-affected-by-the-past, the present - which is timeless and to which the initiative (to do "something") is attributed, and the future - that is, the horizon of expectation, the moment of our hopes.

3. Honing the Self before the Scriptures

Because it is necessary to understand the perspective from which the French philosopher approaches the self (in general) and the Scriptures, we will discuss here how the self is "instructed" by the religious tradition derived from the biblical texts, namely the Jewish and Christian traditions. Moving forward, we will further endeavor, along Ricœur's lines, to show what intimate or inner resources of the self respond to this teaching and which determines it in the form of a constraint (Ricœur 2009a, 42). In other words, it is a positive constraint, for its origin belongs entirely to the self. As such, the 'called' self becomes a responsive self (Niebuhr 1963).

In interpreting sacred texts, and even before this, at a simple reading, we emphasize two things: the specificity of biblical experience and language. But especially on language, because language “completes” experience. Moreover, when Ricœur speaks of the self in the mirror of the Scriptures, he also has in mind an analysis from *Temps et Récit*, where by *configuration* he means the internal organization of the type of discourse under examination, in this case, the narrative of the Testaments. And he calls *refiguration* the effect of discovery and transformation exerted by the discourse on its hearer or reader (Ricœur 2009a, 46). Thus, the issue at hand, using the above terms, is how the original configuration of the biblical text can refigure the self. From a hermeneutical point of view this means the way in which the self is transposed into the open world described by the sacred text (Bondor 2010, 210). It must also be said that the self placed before the Scriptures is *actualized*, which means that its identity is re-actualized.

In order to arrive at the refiguration of the self, Ricœur first shows in what sense does the Christian faith require mediation through language in general and the Scriptures in particular. Then, the second stage of the demonstration consists in showing, starting from Northrop Frye’s *The Great Code* (1999) - a purely literary analysis of the Bible - what the relationship between configuration and refiguration consists in. The third stage involves a historical-critical exegesis oriented towards biblical theology that links the theologoumena related to the various literary genres in the Bible to human responses, which are integral to the meaning of those theological motifs as such. The fourth stage is entirely hermeneutical. In this case, the French philosopher shows how the dialectic between the manifestation of the Name and the withdrawal of the Name has a decisive effect on the constitution of a self, called at the same time to gather itself and to disperse (Ricœur 2009a, 48). From this last stage results an ethical-theological development unthinkable without this devotion to the imageless Name (Ricœur 2017, 109). As we have observed so far, an intimate union is assumed between religious experience and language. In other words, this union consists in faith. Whether we call this faith a “sense of absolute dependence” on a creation that precedes us, an “ultimate care” in the horizon of our own preoccupations, or “unconditional trust”, the union between experience and language is satisfied. Regardless of what we call this faith, in the end it is an act that does not allow itself to be reduced to any kind of writing or language (Ricœur 2009a, 49). As a religious experience, biblical faith is instructed, which is to say formed, enlightened, educated. The presupposition of biblical faith precedes everything we can say about the relationship between the book and the self in the mirror of the sacred text. Concretely, the self, informed by the Scriptures, is an already responding self, because the texts precede life.

Of course, biblical language, Ricœur observes in the footsteps of

Northrop Frye, is completely foreign to our common language. The language of the Scriptures is poetic, and only in this way can we appropriate it, because the internal coherence of biblical language refers immediately to the internal coherence of a metaphorical language. As such, it is itself metaphorical. In such a text, the only relation to reality that matters is that of awakening in the listener and reader the desire to understand oneself (Ricœur 2009a, 56). On the other hand, in the Scriptures there is, and it is given by the internal coherence of language, a kind of imaginative unity. Consequently, by drawing on the text, the imaginative unity of the self (*imaginative variations* brought together within a common horizon) intersects with the imaginative unity of the Scriptures. And through this the self is 'honed' by the biblical text. Moreover, the self comes to define and constitute itself through its own position as a respondent to the propositions of meaning extracted from the symbolic network described above (Ricœur 2009b, 76). In other words, the past of the biblical story is re-actualized and at the same time encapsulated in the present (Hagiu, Lupaşcu and Bortos 2022), from which it follows that the self is not only actualized by the biblical story, but is also "altered", modified by it. Thus, the position of the self as the respondent of the sacred text puts it in a position of openness to certain affective dispositions or of total cancellation of any affective disposition, as in the case of the Hesychasts. This is why Paul Ricœur's thesis on the self seen as an other, beyond its philosophical framework, also involves this "theological" framework. The self "sees" itself as another, "feels" itself as another, namely, in this case, as Christ. The latter would be the point of maximum that the self can reach, continually honing itself through the biblical text.

Bringing together what has been said so far and returning to what was announced in the introduction, specifically to the question of the good life, we would also say that the French philosopher considers that striving for the good life (of the self) consists in a new hermeneutical moment, when hermeneutics becomes ethics. Accordingly, at an ethical level, the good life is pursued, and not just anyway, but *together with* and *for* others in just institutions (Ricœur 1991, 260). Likewise, by making room for the idea of responsibility, Ricœur configures a philosophy of otherness, leaving the individual the power (and freedom) to say "yes" to life (Abel 2010).

4. Self-Interpretation as a Form of Philosophical Counselling

Sandu Frunză (2022, 98) considers that philosophical counselling is a response to the crises experienced by contemporary humanity and, as a result, represents a new tool, as mentioned above, for self-understanding. On the other hand, Vasile Haţegan (2021, 147) observes that with the help of philosophical counselling practices, elements of spirituality or religion

can be identified and developed that contribute to personal development. The IPAA method of counselling consists of four principles of solving possible existential problems that may arise in the individual's daily life and that help him in understanding himself. These principles are: "1) The principle of identification: understanding the problem; 2) The principle of planning: designing a solution plan; 3) The principle of application: achieving what is proposed in the plan; 4) The principle of assumption: reflection on the advantages and disadvantages of assuming a possible solution (the overview of the problem and the solution or solutions and choosing the appropriate solution)" (Hagiu, Bortoş and Tamaş 2023, 53), which are completed by "1a) Identifying or detecting the problem; 4a) Assuming a moral/existential position" (Hagiu, Bortoş and Tamaş 2023, 54).

Among the problems of contemporary society, we find the contribution that religion has in everyday life and in the discussions that a philosophical counsellor may have with a client as an abstracted problem and approached as a metaphysical matter (Frunză 2019, 97). Moreover, it is relevant in this context the observation that "The spiritual world is the domain of experience where people create meaning for themselves and make sense of things" (van Deurzen 2002, 87). We note that this is that same meaning that in Collingwoodian metaphysics has as analysis of the absolute presuppositions of an epoch or of a culture or, ultimately, as a method of understanding the world (Hagiu, Lupaşcu and Bortoş 2023). Returning to the thesis of this paper, namely to show how the interpretation of the self is in fact the understanding of the self mirrored in the sacred texts, is also an opportunity to show how the indicated counselling method works. In the hypotheses of Ricœurian philosophy outlined in the previous sections the internalization of the praxis of life is the task of each individual (Jervolino 2000, 93); of course, a difficult task that led the French thinker to highlight a relationship between the self and public life, given faith and culture, religion and politics, etc. (Doran 1973, 457).

Therefore, religion in everyday life is, first of all, a remedy for existential problems, because through the honing of the self by putting the self before the Scriptures, according with the hypotheses of Ricœurian philosophy presented above, it interprets itself and thus understands itself. Man's need for meaning or the need for a fulfilled life finds consolation in sacred texts. More precisely, the self, subject to the sacred word, is subject to moral conduct. Of course, in relation to the IPAA method of philosophical counselling, given the generality of its principles, the role played by the philosophical counsellor can often be taken, as we have said, by the priest, pastor. It is also easy to see that the principles of this method operate in such a situation in the following way: suppose an individual who considers himself religious finds that some questions arise in his own life, for example about the meaning of life. He feels that he

needs the help of a philosophical counsellor and, as such, turns to such a specialist, who, as mentioned, may be a part of the clergy. With this the first principle of the IPAA method is already satisfied by the client, as he has identified the problem, and it then falls to the counsellor to apply the second principle - to develop a plan. This is where the Ricœurian theory of the self honed by the Scriptures comes in, the counselling plan being designed so that the client can work through certain texts in which similar situations are presented together with the counsellor - of course, we assume that the philosophical counsellor who intervenes in such a case is familiar with the sacred text. By bringing out certain meanings of the sacred texts with the aid of the philosophical counsellor, the client enters the world of these texts. Furthermore, the third principle of the IPAA method is fulfilled when the client approaches a minimal understanding of self, applying the norms, behaviors or teachings acquired through exposure to the sacred text in their own life. The fourth principle of the IPAA method, in the dimensions of the present example, consists in the commitment on the part of the client, following the resolution of the problem, to an existential position that approaches, both intellectually and practically, the prototype of his own fulfilled life. Of course, the example here is simplified if the individual is faced with such problems, because the principles indicated also function without the input of a philosophical counsellor. More precisely, if in our example we are talking about philosophical counselling and self-understanding, in this second observation we are talking about philosophical self-counselling and self-understanding. Now, keeping in mind the Ricœurian spirit of the present work, as long as the client reaches this (self-)understanding of self, we can conclude that he takes responsibility for a good life with others and for others.

5. Conclusions and Practical Implications

Vasile Cătălin Bobb (2011, 300) has argued that Paul Ricœur's hermeneutics was developed under the auspices of biblical or religious hermeneutics, rather than theological hermeneutics. This according to some of the philosopher's own clarifications (Ricœur 1985). However, the same interpreter of Ricœur's writings has shown that, in fact, for the French philosopher hermeneutics is developed along the lines of the hermeneutics of sacred texts (Bobb 2012, 159). Therefore, to talk about the hermeneutics of the self or the constitution of the self for Paul Ricœur invites the discussion of how the self allows itself to be/is honed by the sacred text.

Therefore, in the present paper we set out to justify the thesis that self-interpretation is in fact self-understanding, and this self-under-

standing is enhanced by “putting” the self face to face with sacred texts. At the same time, this method of self-understanding according to the IPAA method of philosophical counselling is a form of self-counselling. However, in order to offer sufficient arguments, it was necessary to fulfill the three objectives mentioned in the Introduction. To sum it up, we started from the concept of narrative identity, because it allows each of us to tell the stories of our own lives, but also to assume a tradition be it cultural, social, religious, or other. Next, we argued that for the French philosopher the self mirrored in the Scriptures is honed by these texts. That after their lecture it assumes, more often than not, an existential/moral position in view of a (better) life. We have described this in order to demonstrate how religion plays an important role in everyday life, especially when translated through the four principles of the IPAA counselling method. Ultimately, it is yet another contribution towards a good life, free of existential problems.

To sum up, among the practical implications of this study we can mention that: (1) it is an illustration of how religion intervenes in the life of the individual, on the one hand, and then of the existential or intellectual contribution that sacred texts have in the interpretation of the self, thus in the understanding of the self; (2) we have outlined how the IPAA method of philosophical counselling can be implemented, and we have done so by noting that the role of the philosophical counsellor, when it comes to religious issues, can be taken on by a religious minister. Hence its usefulness in counselling environments; (3) finally, taking into account the rich philosophical assumptions, we can assert the hermeneutic character of the present study.

References:

Abel, Olivier. 2010. *Le Oui de Paul Ricœur*. Paris: Les petits Platons.

Ammerman, Nancy T. 2014. “Finding Religion in Everyday Life.” *Sociology of Religion*, 75 (2) 189-207. doi: 10.1093/socrel/sru013

Bobb, Vasile Cătălin. 2015. *Hermeneutica și problema răului în filosofia lui Paul Ricœur*. Cluj-Napoca: Presa Universitară Clujeană.

Bobb, Vasile Cătălin. 2011. “From the Problem of ‘Evil’ to Interpretation. «Hermeneutic Phenomenology» as a Method for Understanding the Religious Discourse” *Journal for the Study of Religions and Ideologies* 10 (30): 299-317.

Bobb, Vasile Cătălin. 2012. “Towards a ‘Hermeneutics of Historical Consciousness’? Questioning Ricœur.” *META: Research in Hermeneutics, Phenomenology, and Practical Philosophy* IV (1): 154-165.

Bondor, George. 2010. “Paul Ricoeur and the biblical hermeneutics.” *Journal for the Study of Religions and Ideologies* 9 (27): 203-218.

- Bondor, George. 2012. "Problema explicitării. De la Husserl și Heidegger la Ricœur", În *Imagine și text*, edited by George Bondor, Cristian Nae (coord.), 42-52. Iași: Editura Universității „Al. I. Cuza”.
- Doran, Robert M. 1973. "Paul Ricoeur: Toward the restoration of meaning." *Anglican Theological Review* 55 (4): 443-458.
- Frunză, Mihaela, Sandu Frunză, and Nicolae Ovidiu Grad. 2019. "The role of spirituality in therapeutic practices." *Journal for the Study of Religions and Ideologies* 18 (53): 60-74.
- Frunză, Sandu. 2019. *Comunicare și consiliere filosofică*. București: Eikon.
- Frunză, Sandu. 2022. "Philosophical counseling – a useful tool for our daily life." *Journal for the Study of Religions and Ideologies* 21 (61): 97-114.
- Frye, Northrop. 1999. *Marele Cod: Biblia și literatura*. Translated by Aurel Sasu și Ioana Stanciu. București: Atlas.
- Gavriliuță, Nicu. 2013. *Sociologia religiilor: credințe, ritualuri, ideologii*. Iași: Polirom.
- Grondin, Jean. 2013. *Paul Ricoeur*. Paris: PUF.
- Hagiu, Adrian, and Sergiu Bortos. 2022. "An overview of philosophical counseling in Romania." *Journal for the Study of Religions and Ideologies* 21 (61): 3-18.
- Hagiu, Adrian, Constantin C. Lupașcu, and Sergiu Bortos. 2022. "Robin George Collingwood on Understanding the Historical Past." *Hermeneia* 29 (2): 83-92.
- Hagiu, Adrian, Constantin C. Lupașcu, and Sergiu Bortos. 2023. "Robin George Collingwood on Metaphysics As Understanding the World." *Technium Social Sciences Journal* 41 (1): 404-411. doi: 10.47577/tssj.v41i1.8488
- Hagiu, Adrian, Sergiu Bortos, and Iosif Tamaș. 2023. "A New Method in Philosophical Counseling (IPAA)." *Postmodern Openings* 14 (1): 46-61. doi: 10.18662/po/14.1/603.
- Hațegan, Vasile. 2021. "The Practice of Counseling between Philosophy and Spirituality, An Interdisciplinary Approach." *Journal for the Study of Religions and Ideologies* 20 (58): 146-160.
- Hunt, Stephen. 2005. *Religion and Everyday Life (1st ed.)*. New York: Routledge. doi: 10.4324/9780203028391
- Jervolino, Domenico. 2000. "Herméneutique et traduction. L'autre, l'étranger, l'hôte." *Archives de Philosophie* 63 (1): 79-93.
- McGuire, Meredith B. (2008). *Lived Religion: Faith and Practice in Everyday Life*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Niebuhr, H. Richard. 1963. *The Responsive Self*. New York: Harper and Row.
- Ricœur, Paul. 1985. *Temps et Récit III*. Paris: Éditions du Seuil.
- Ricœur, Paul. 1988. "L'identité narrative." *Esprit* nr. 7-8: 295-304.
- Ricœur, Paul. 1991. *Lectures 1. Autour du politique*. Paris: Éditions du Seuil.
- Ricœur, Paul. 1999. *Conflictul interpretărilor: eseuri de hermeneutică I*. Translated and with an afterword by Horia Lazăr. Cluj-Napoca: Echinoc.

Ricœur, Paul. 2009a. „Sinele în oglinda Scripturilor”. In Paul Ricœur, *Iubire și justiție*. Translated by Mădălin Roșioru, 39-72. București: Art.

Ricœur, Paul. 2009b. “Sinele *mandatat*. O my prophetic soul!”, In Paul Ricœur, *Iubire și justiție*. Translated by Mădălin Roșioru, 73-111. București: Art.

Ricœur, Paul. 2016. *Sinele ca un altul*. Translated by A.D. Marinescu și P. Marinescu. București: Spandugino.

Ricœur, Paul. 2017. *În viață până la moarte*. Translated by D. Bucur. București: Spandugino

van Deurzen, Emmy. 2002. *Existential Counselling & Psychotherapy in Practice*. Second edition. London: SAGE.