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EVOLUTION OF ISLAMIC RADICALISM DURING
THE 19TH TO 21ST CENTURIES

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Abstract: This article is an overview of the evolution of Islamic radicalism during the 19th - 21st centuries. It demonstrates that nineteenth century Islamic radicalism is based on the ideas of pan-Islamism, whose main representatives are J. al-Din al-Afghani and M. Abduh. In turn, Islamic radicalism of the twentieth to twentyfirst centuries is based on the ideas of Islamic fundamentalism. Its main representatives are H. Al-Banna, S. Qutb, the Deoband movement, al-Maududi and R. Khomeyni.

Pan-Islamic theories of the 19th-20th centuries are based on the thesis that people who seek liberation from colonial oppression should merge. However, scholars have different views on the union of the Muslim world. It was, once, regarded as a combination of historical circumstances and the political realities of the nineteenth century. These were further shaped by the basic idea of Islamic fundamentalism in the twentieth to twentyfirst centuries, which is Salafiyya, or a return to “pure Islam”, a revival of active faith traditions and the union of all walks of life under the Sharia law and strict interpretation and application of its rules. The instruments used by Islamic fundamentalists and radicals to implement it have been the Islam-related slogans for Takfir and Jihad. But in the 21st century, integration and globalization have started playing a significant role. Various geopolitical forces are using various tools, including the idea of Islamic radicalism

Key words: Islamic radicalism, Pan-Islamism, fundamentalism, Salafism.

1. Introduction. Formulation of the problem

The Radicalism forms at crucial historical moments, when awareness of societal contradictions reaches a level that generates such activities. The reason for the current rise of interest in Islamic radicalism is due to the Islamization of society, stemming from a sudden transformation of society that led to a systemic crisis. Islamic radicalism, which is a doctrine that is both religious-philosophical and socio-political based on the ideas of radical Islam, is uncompromising in defense of its views. This is based on a one-sided interpretation of the provisions of its religion, and is committed to applying Islamic rules and principles in all spheres of human activity in any society or state where Muslims live, as well as in international relations. Islamic radicalism is a religious and philosophical phenomenon underpinned by a political phenomenon, such as Islamism as political ideology, and socio-political practices that attempt to realize the ideals proposed by the theoreticians of Islamic radicalism. By the nineteenth century, radicalism in Islam had sprouted in various branches. Since the beginning of the nineteenth century, radicalism manifested itself in the appearance of ideological currents and the formation of religious and political associations and organizations (Vorster 2008; Frunză, Frunză 2009).

2. Research reports

From among the most outstanding works on the evolution of Islamic radicalism in the 19th to 20th centuries we should mention the works of the theorists of Islamic radicalism. The best-known and most influential theorists and thinkers are Egyptians M. Abduh, H. Al-Banna and S. Kutb; Pakistani al-Maududi; Iranian religious and political leaders Ayatollah R. Khomeyni and Ali Shariati. As a rule, radical Muslim thinkers themselves actively participated in the political life of their countries.

The work of radical Islamic thinkers needs to be investigated based on the specific historical circumstances of their writing, and taking into account the reasons that led to the presentation of the ideas which particularly appeal to the supporters of Islamic radicalism today.

In addition, it is necessary to investigate the work of contemporary scholars of the history of Islam that studied Islamic radicalism. This includes the works of V. Naumkin, L. Syukiyaynen, M. Stepanyants, and others.

3. Purpose of the article

The purpose of the article is to serve as an overview of the philosophical and religious background, essence and forms of Islamic radicalism during the limited chronological framework of the 19th-21st centuries, starting with the pan-Islamism theories of Sayid Jamal al-Din al-Afghani and his disciple, follower and social activist Muhammad Abduh, to fundamentalist theories, the main representatives of which are H. Al-Banna, S. Qutb, the Deoband movement, al-Maududi, Ali Shariati, and Ayatollah R. Khomeyni. However, this manuscript analyzes events related to Islamic radicalism in the 21st century, albeit based on the previous stages of the evolution of Islamic radicalism.

4. Main thesis

Given the ambivalence of the Quran and many of its interpretations, the concrete historical conditions and political realities of the nineteenth century and the religious and political life in the Islamic world, the influential idea of pan-Islamism took hold, particularly in modern Islamic radicalist ideology.

In the 19th century, the Ottoman Empire was in a stage of a protracted crisis. During the mid-nineteenth century, Egyptian ruler Muhammad Ali, at first a subordinate of the Ottoman sultan, conquered Syria and became a threat to the central government. Under Muhammad Ali, the country set up new schools, the Ministry of Education was established, and the medieval university Al-Azhar regained its status as one of the main centers of Islamic theology. Thus, the governor sought to overcome the backwardness of the country. The new era heralded the beginning of new trends as well as giving impetus to the old Arab nationalism and Islamic movements.

This process contributed to the emergence of pan-Islamism in Egypt and the rise of ideologues of the Reformation, among which one should mention Muhammad Abduh and Jamal Al-Din Al-Afghani.

An important factor in the modernization of Egypt was that, despite the establishment of contacts with leading European countries, this process was not accompanied by westernization and was based exclusively on Islamic culture.

In the second half of the 19th century, al-Afghani concluded that peoples seeking liberation from colonial oppression should merge. Muslim thinkers and religious and political leaders formulated the idea of "religious and political union of Muslim nations" in the fight against the European powers and the creation of a confederation of Muslim states (led by a Caliph), based on the ideas of social equality and justice, grounded on

the moral and ethical teachings of Islam. Overall, al-Afghani advises that the union should not only be religion-based but also one relying on linguistic, ethnic and racial affinities, for people to better understand one other. Al-Afghani insisted that the latter surpassed the importance of religion, because “it remains unchanged... longer. We see a race that speaks one language and the same for thousands of years, but repeatedly changes its faith” (Rasul-Zade 1985, 67).

Al-Afghani saw no other means of protection against colonialism. Launching the idea of pan-Islamism, al-Afghani laid the foundation for its further understanding and development. One of the best students and followers of al-Afghani was Muhammad Abduh (1845-1905). However, “despite the common goal – the liberation of Muslim nations and the revival of Islam – the programs of M. Abduh and al-Din al-Afghani vary considerably. The latter was a revolutionary, whereas Abduh, on the contrary, believed that political revolution cannot provide results that lead to a gradual spiritual transformation” (Stepanyants 1974, 289).

According to M. Abduh, social welfare is dependent on moral improvement and religious reformation. Thus, moral improvement, based on religion, is the path to social progress. Religion can therefore be a boost to and a resource for human activity. At the same time though, the activities of people, and not the will of God, is the real source of welfare.

M. Abduh, as well as J. al-Din al-Afghani, were supporters of the establishment of a Muslim caliphate. “The main difference between Abduh and al-Afghani was not that between a “reformist”, the former, and a “revolutionary”, the latter, but rather between their ideas, as each placed emphasis on certain activities. Whereas al-Afghani was occupied primarily with pan-Islamist propaganda, Abduh concentrated on awakening social consciousness in Muslims and a rethinking of the Islamic faith” (Stepanyants 1974, 291).

The ideas and slogans of al-Afghani and his followers gradually transformed and underwent many interpretations, often contradictory to each other. The idea of pan-Islamism in its modern interpretation sounds like a movement of “Islamic solidarity”, which finds its application in the creation of international Islamic organizations – the Islamic World League, the World Islamic Conference, and others. This idea was, and is, used by numerous radical Islamic organizations. Specifically, in the first half of the twentieth century it was used by the “Muslim Brotherhood.”

H. Sheikh al-Banna laid the foundation of his teaching in the so-called principle of supra-class unity of the Muslim community and the opposition of non-Muslims. Muslims are brothers in faith and all equal, because as members of the Ummah, devout Muslims do not recognize any division into any classes, parties, groups, etc.

Overall, his teaching can be reduced to the following provisions:

- as a result of colonial expansion in the Muslim West (including Egypt), Islam alienated society that was

entrenched in social institutions and norms, where prescriptions of the Quran and Sunnah were violated;

- the Western ideology and models of development that are so actively imposed on the Islamic world, as well as lifestyle, are unacceptable for Muslims;
- Islam is a political ideology, politics should be a part of religion, and the religion is characterized by militancy;
- need to revive Islam and to build a Muslim state, which will operate under Sharia law and ensure strict compliance with the prescriptions of the Quran and Sunnah;
- for all Muslims, the unity of the people and the interests of the Ummah are above the national interests, division of Muslims along ethnic lines is unacceptable;
- the main task of the Islamic Ummah is to prevent the political, ideological and cultural expansion of the West;
- all Muslims are soldiers of Allah and must sacrifice themselves without requiring anything in return (Ezhova 2005, 41-68).

The Association began to become politicized in the late 1930s. After the Second World War, there was a real surge of violence caused by the activities of the “Muslim Brotherhood”. Indeed, in the 1940-50’s, H. al-Banna did not reject violence as a means and defended its necessity for goal implementation.

During this period, the ideological concept of “hakimiyyi” (Omnipotence, all-encompassing power of Allah), added new meaning to the term “dzhahiliyya” (earlier – pre-Islamic polytheism, and now – characteristically, “sin”, which is essentially the regime). In the 1950-60s, the chief theorist and ideologist of the “Muslim Brotherhood”, a respected figure among Islamic radicals – Egyptian Sayyid Qutb continued his work with great literary and polemical talent along the ideological lines of H. Al-Banna. According to the Egyptian historian, politician and journalist R. Said, S. Qutb “combated colonialism, socialism, democracy or dictatorship, which, regardless of their nature, whether the Egyptian regime was friendly or hostile to them, are incorrect. He rejected the existing regime in the country, complete with all its manifestations and assurances” (As-Said 1998, 39). Thus S. Qutb promoted the formulation of two ideological strains within the Association: first – allegations of unbelief and godlessness in the governor, and second – domination and the rise of faith. These were, clearly, repressed by the authorities.

S. Qutb expanded the concept of Jihad to the armed struggle against the infidels, whereas the classical understanding is one of a personal spiritual effort towards understanding the believer of Allah.

The principles of distinction between moderate and radical extremists regarding “jahiliyyah” had an impact on the interpretation of

the provisions of Takfir. Thus, the extremist interpretations of S. Qutb led to the adoption of laws based on revolutionary armed rebellion against the existing order in Muslim countries. As such, by the legalization of “fitna” (rebellion, confusion), he approved of a provision that is alien to orthodox Sunni Islam.

In parallel to the above, in Central Asia, there was an intensification of the activities of the intellectual center in Deoband in India. The focus of the center is on the idea of a return to the orthodoxy of the Abbasid era – the heyday of Muslim statehood and culture – and the idea of revival of the caliphate.

Deoband views were quite extreme and fanatical, like the Salafists’, whose ideas have been described here, preaching an uncompromising way of achieving them. In particular, the Deoband regarded as possible the armed struggle under the banner of Jihad, but the attitude was not too radical: in their understanding it was an extreme method employed to combat a hostile ruling regime. Although the founders and supporters of the school “Darul Uloom” actively fought against British colonialism, they also demonstrated pragmatism and realism. The Deoband school also called for the restoration of the cultural and religious unity of the Muslim community. But the main way to this unity was to prevent excessive concentration of power and property. The political positions of the Deoband were always relevant to the time and context, as well as dependent upon contingent events. Thus during colonialism, the school supported the idea of independence from British colonial rule and, after the formation of Pakistan, it started to criticise secular power.

The basic principles of “Tablighi Jamaat” are:

- The Islamic call must implement not only scientists, but most Muslims.
- Do not wait for the people to come to preach, because people have to go to the preacher themselves.
- Financial support of the preachers rests on the shoulders of the preachers.
- The movement must be presented to all social levels within society.
- The first priority is not the conversion of non-Muslims to Islam but strengthening the faith of most Muslims.
- A call to all Muslims is the main goal of the movement, as dogmatic and political differences are prohibited (Gaborieau 1999, 21).

Opponents of the movement tend to treat it as an international organization that coordinates the radical Sunni extremists (Alekseev 2003, 70). Ideas of the Deoband also influenced the views and politics of the famous theologian al-Maududi, whose teaching is focused around the need for Jihad directed against the oppressors.

Said Abu al-Maududi is one of the most famous and influential ideologists of the moderate wing of Islamic radicalism. Being a supporter of the formation of a separate Muslim state in North-Western India, which was populated mostly by Muslims, al-Maududi founded the political organization “Jamaat al-Islamiya” (“Islamic Society”), whose main objective is the struggle for the establishment of Pakistan (this name was proposed for this part of India in 1930) under Islamic laws. Nearly two decades after, Pakistan achieved independence (1947) after the war between Pakistan and India, during which time al-Maududi called on all citizens of the country to take part in protecting the country from aggression, calling resistance obligatory (*fard al-ain*) for all Muslims.

Al-Maududi claimed that the causes of suffering that accompanied the newly created state lay in the expansion of Western culture, and hence of secularism, which is unacceptable for true Muslim communities. Therefore, Muslims must conduct their struggle for complete liberation with the formation of an Islamic state. As such, al-Maududi laid the foundations of the theory of the “Islamic state” (Binder 1960, 217).

According to this theory, the creation of such a state is the result of “Islamic revolution” that will lead to establishing a perfect social order in which virtue will flourish, and all forms of exploitation and injustice will be nullified and repressed. During this revolution not only will there be a radical change in the socio-economic structure of society but also a moral improvement of citizens based on the tenets of Islam. The form of government in this “Islamic state” will be similar to the rule of the Prophet.

According to the ideologies of Islamic radicalism, the construction of the “Islamic State” is possible in two ways, peaceful and armed, the difference between them lying in the choice of the methods employed by the struggle to achieve their goals. Radicals following the first path are called “moderate”, whereas those that choose the second path are the revolutionary-minded radicals. Abandoning the armed path, moderate radicals place emphasis on employing propaganda on the population through the so-called “Islamic call” (*da’va*) that allows you to gain votes in free elections and come to power through legal means.

Al-Maududi followed the more moderate views, although not immediately. Under the slogan of the need to make the newly created Pakistan into a “truly Islamic” state, immediately after independence, al-Maududi put forward 22 principles for the construction of the “Islamic state” that formed the basis of some principles of the future constitution of Pakistan.

Later, Al-Maududi gradually began to consistently oppose building the Islamic state by force of arms. He even described this violent and premature method as not promising, despite the fact that he wanted to reach his goals by the shortest route.

In the mid-twentieth century, the evolution of Islamic radicalism

significantly influenced the Arab-Israeli struggle in the Middle East, and later the Islamic revolution in Iran. Islamic religious-political movements in the 1970-1980's had tried to meet the needs of society, acquire a wider social base. It was the Islamic revolution in Iran that has become the event through which Islamic radicalism announced itself on the international stage.

The aspects of the revolution that took place, including the rhetoric of Ayatollah Khomeini with the threat of exporting the Islamic revolution, was in the eyes of all Americans and Europeans as being synonymous with radicalism and Islam, and as a result – almost all was labeled Islamic radicalism. The ideologues of the Islamic revolution in Iran were Ayatollah Khomeini and Ali Shariati.

Ali Shariati believed that the systems that exist in the world today drive humanity to a new form of slavery. Although not physical, it is much worse than the forms of slavery that preceded it. It is the enslaving of mind, heart and the will power of man. Loyalty, pure human purposes and duties, and belief in your own thoughts and mind are completely substituted by the “values”, a “system imposed by us under the name of sociology, education, art, sexual and financial independence! The system transforms us into empty vessels that can be filled with anything!” (Shariati 1979, 155).

Ayatollah Khomeini Ruholla developed the concept of “Islamic rule” (*Vilayat-e Faqih*). The essence of the concept is that political power should pass into the hands of the clergy – or rather the hands of an exemplary theologian, which is inherent in their high personal qualities and profound knowledge – Faqih. This power should be concentrated in the hands of the Faqih until the coming of the Mahdi.

The Faqih is the supreme interpreter of divine law, which has the highest control over the power of the secular state, and the army and security forces. Above him there is only the power of God and “hidden” Imam Mahdi. Other public bodies and institutions are designed only to teach proper interpretation of Shariah and monitor its implementation stemming from the interpretation of its regulations.

Thus, all government agencies and institutions are designed to only execute and monitor the correct implementation of Shariah interpretations and the regulations leading to them. Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini in fact approved the personalized Islamic rule. But the concept of “Islamic government” is a traditionalist modified model of a theocratic rule that is personified.

The Islamic revolution in Iran significantly influenced the activities of Islamic radicals and their activities against Israel. There was an increased emphasis on religious rhetoric in the Palestinian resistance movement, and in 1982, in Lebanon within the Shia “Hezbollah”, which, incidentally, is still considered subordinate to Tehran. “Hezbollah” in turn, “complements” the Palestinian faction “Islamic Jihad”, which also

appeared in the 1980s. Thus, the Islamic revolution that promoted Islamization also influenced the Arab-Palestinian conflict, which in turn is an indicator of the relations between the Muslim and Western worlds.

In parallel with the Islamic revolution in Iran, neighboring Afghanistan erupted into a civil war, which can be roughly divided into two sub-periods – during the existence of several distinct Afghan communities, and the formation and coming into power of the “Taliban” organization.

The Taliban were distinguished by extreme religious intolerance. Supporters of the Sunni form of Islam, they were persecuted by the Shiites because of their sharply deteriorated relations with neighboring Iran. In the areas controlled by them, the “Taliban” introduced Shariah, the implementation of which was strictly required. Television, music and musical instruments, art, alcohol, computers and the Internet, chess, white shoes (white – the color of the flag of the Taliban) and countless other things were banned. Men were required to always wear beards of a certain length. Women were not allowed to work, be treated by male doctors, appear in public bare faced, and unaccompanied by a husband or male relative. In addition, women’s access to education was greatly restricted (in 2001 girls accounted for only 1% of all students). Finally, they widely practiced medieval penalties: cutting off one or both hands for stealing, and stoning to death adulterers.

The ideology of the Taliban partly borrowed the concept of “Islamic government” from Ayatollah Khomeini, and relied on the thesis of the indivisibility of religion and politics and the key role of the clergy in government. The use of this thesis was due to the fact that during the civil war at the time, power was in the hands of the clergy, who by using this particular ideological basis managed to control territories through a powerful and effective system of state power and establish their religious and political dictatorship, thereby demonstrating to the world their military, religious and political force. Against this background, in the late twentieth century, within the circle of supporters of Islamic radicalism there emerged the idea of consolidating the Islamic world, which could be achieved under a single leader or a single organization. This actively promoted idea became “Al-Qaeda”, created in 1988-1989. Researchers at this stage, as a rule, emphasize its unique features, and connect it to international Islamic terrorism, which equals describing this period as the evolution of Islamic radicalism.

In February 1998, under the slogan of fighting the Jews and the “Crusaders”, “Al Qaeda” and a number of extremist groups (Pakistani “al-Hadith”, Yemeni “Jihad”, Jordan “Bayat al-Imam”, Lebanese “Osbat al-Ansar” and “Jamaa Islamiyah,” the Libyan “Al-Jamaa al-Islamiya”, etc.), announced the creation of the “World jihad front”. The organization immediately proceeded to bomb the US embassies in Nairobi (Kenya) and Dar es Salaam (Tanzania) in 1998, killing 240 people. One of the

distinguishing features of the “World Jihad Front” was the desire to secure weapons of mass destruction.

From inception, the radical Islamic organizations in Africa (“Boko Haram” Nigeria, “Al-Shabaab” Somalia), called for the eradication of western education, eviction of foreigners of Western origins and, of course, the extension of the Sharia law, even while they mired the country in civil war. Once northern Nigeria (12 out of 36 states) embraced the Sharia law in the region (initially within two tribes –House and Igbo), the radical organization “Boko Haram” appeared. The latter is based on ideas that were formed in the 1980s among the Nigerian intellectuals, students and the Hybrid Salafi and Sufi, which demanded complete rejection of an English Education for the Arabic population (although Nigerians are not Arabs, and historically Nigeria has been mostly English-speaking) and a return to the spirit of Islam that prevailed in early Muslim times. Today, the “Boko Haram” continues to operate and keep at bay the population of the Northern Territory of Nigeria.

In 2004, during the civil war in Somalia, there existed another active organization, now known as “Al-Shabaab” (Arabic for Youth), which tried to unite the country mired in civil war. Continuing the idea of consolidating the Muslim world (in fact, the radical Islamic religious-political movements and organizations), it tried to influence the activities of Nigerian and Somali radicals, and “Al Qaeda”. “Al-Shabaab” is sometimes called the “Somali branch of” Al Qaeda”, most commonly in the American media.

After the defeat of ICU, Ayman al-Zawahiri appealed to the Somali Mujahideen not to give up. They considered this defeat only as a first stage in the struggle, not even meaning the ideological surrender of the Mujahideen. What’s more, representatives of “Al-Shabab” and “Al Qaeda” made a statement concerning the formation of “Mujahideen Ethiopia”, whose actions were in line with on bin Laden’s and “Al Qaeda” precepts, ready to fight for as long as Ethiopia was not under Shariah.

In January, 2011, Kuwaiti Sheikh Hamid Bin Abdullah Al-Ali published an appeal entitled “Covenant Supreme Council of Jihad Groups”. The document is another attempt to consolidate various Islamic radical religious-political movements and organizations based on overall strategy. However, in this document it is clear that the call is to act on the basis of general ideological lines, and focuses on the fact that consolidation still does not mean the creation of a clear single organization with a distinct hierarchy (Zin`ko 2005, 112).

However, apart from the Islamic radical religious-political movements and organizations, in the 21st century we can also note the issue of the evolution of Islam jihadist trends among immigrant populations in Western Europe, where the concept of the “clash of civilizations” has taken clear shape.

This evolution has passed through several stages. At first, jihadism was associated with political conflicts in Muslim countries, particularly in North Africa. European Islamic radicals were at the time political refugees from Muslim countries. They lived in communities in Europe, worked to create support networks for their organizations that fought in their countries of origin. Examples include Algerians in France, Moroccans in Spain, etc. That is, their activity was not directed against Europe, as they worked to support the Islamists in the Arab world.

After September 11, 2001, everything changed. Islamic radicals began to refer to Europe not as a base but as a target. The nature of the cells changed. Thus, in the 90s, the members of the cells were persons with the status of refugees, while in the new century there began the process of radicalization of the population born in Europe. Among this population there were already citizens of European countries, but not Europeans by origin.

A lot of young Europeans of Muslim origins are turning to Islam in search of identity. Torn between the “foreign” culture of their parents and the culture of the country where they grew up, they turn to religion in search of answers. Often, the Islam jihadist areas are ready to give them this identity. This is especially true for France, Germany, Great Britain and Holland.

Another problem of 21st century Islamic radicalism deals with the active response of large social groups to the fast changes in the traditional values of civilization. Thus, based on the Islamic radical movement there is the desire to preserve one’s identity.

The doctrine of Islamic radicalism actively preaches fundamental religious values and the needs of the population to radically transform society, which offers them unfavorable conditions. These ideologies elevate to absolutes certain fundamentals of particular religions or life and worldviews, and interlace their ideas and methods around these absolutes (Vorster 2008, 44).

An example is the revolutions in the countries of the Middle East and North Africa (in Tunisia, Libya, Jordan, Egypt, Yemen, Syria), also called the Arab Spring. We can see three different examples of the demise of these revolutions and uprisings. Some are in progress, in Yemen, Libya and Syria, but some, like those in Saudi Arabia or Bahrain, were simply suppressed, but we shall discuss them nevertheless.

Yemen is an example of what we may call a “peaceful resolution” of the situation. Originally, it replaced one odious authoritarian ruler by another less odious ruler, who previously was vice-president, but with security guarantees for the former dictator and promises of reform. Such regimes are generally preserved. In addition, in Yemen there were relatively strong positions against al-Qaida and through a “peaceful resolution” of the situation, the ideas of Islamic radicalism were not allowed to manifest as in other countries.

In Libya, the revolution is over today, following a complete overthrow of the former regime. But, *de facto*, Libya is in a state of civil war. Moreover, one can often hear that Libya is still waiting for Islamization, the latter in a negative sense.

And, of course, we must mention the various geopolitical forces using various tools, including the idea of Islamic radicalism (Firestone 2010; Kepel 2002).

As for Syria, we can talk about the conflict of interests of different geopolitical forces that actively use the ideas of Islamic radicalism. In particular, in recent years, one can often hear that the opposition keeps its action under Islamic banners carrying Islamist slogans. Given that the majority of the population is Sunni in Syria, the Alawites have been in power for a long time, and the confessional factor is very important in the development of the events in the country. In particular, across Syria a fierce information war is raging and Islamic radicalism intimidation is one of the factors of this war as well.

As a result of this process we can now note the foundation of the organization of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant. We have been able to speak about it since April 2013, which marks the beginning of the expansion of this organization into Syria. As a result, on June 29, 2014, ISIL declared itself a worldwide caliphate. However, attempts to declare this caliphate suffered crushing criticism from the international community and leading Muslim groups.

In general, the Arab Spring revolution was not the exclusive work of the poor. Of late, there emerged in the region quite large stratum of educated young people who have been struggling to find their place in society. Revolutionary upheaval in Tunisia engaged a relatively high percentage of graduates, some of whom had been educated in France. These segments of the population used social networks, including Twitter and Facebook, through which they communicated with peers and mobilized citizens, including disseminating calls for disobedience. It is this particular revolution in the Middle East and North Africa causing a chain reaction that led to the emergence of protest movements in many other countries.

The wave of revolutions showed that a lot of countries needed modernization of the Islamic world. In turn, the successful modernization in Muslim countries is not possible without Islam, and its ideological, moral, and, to some extent, political upgrading.

5. Conclusion

Any radicalism, including Islamic, is an uncompromising desire to go to the end, to seek radical changes and complete activity reform. The doctrine of Islamic radicalism actively preaches basic religious values and meeting the needs of the population, through the radical transformation

of society.

The Islamic radicalism of the nineteenth century is based on the ideas of pan-Islamism. Its main representatives are J. Al-Din al-Afghani and M. Abduh. The main ideas of pan-Islamism are:

- reforming the religious, social, political and economic life in order to return to the original foundations of Islam;
- political reform based on Islamic Shura (consultative council), embodied in a parliamentary form of government;
- revival of the Caliphate, where secular and religious authorities have been inseparable, and the life of the Muslim community was subject to social and economic justice;
- unification of all Islamic states within a single Islamic League.

The Islamic radicalism of the twentieth century was based on the ideas of Islamic fundamentalism. Its main representatives are H. Al-Banna, S. Qutb, the Deoband movement, Al-Maududi, Ayatollah Ali Shariati and R. Khomeyni.

The main ideas of Islamic fundamentalism are:

- Salafi or a return to “pure Islam”;
- revival of active faith traditions and restoration of the authority of Allah;
- union of all walks of life under Sharia law with comprehensive application of its provisions;
- universality of Islam - and universality of religion and society.

The instruments through which these slogans were implemented by Islamic radicals were the announcement of Takfir and Jihad.

Achieving the goals set by Islamic radicalism is possible in two ways - either through compromise and moderation or through uncompromising struggle. The concept of Islamic radicalism, justifying the correctness of the former, was called “moderates”. Justification of uncompromising struggle is the main way chosen by revolutionary-minded Islamic radicalism.

These opposite approaches developed as pan-Islamist and fundamentalist theories. The main representative of moderate radicalism in pan-Islamist theories was M. Abduh, and in the fundamentalist ones, A. Al-Maududi. The representatives of revolutionary Islamic radicalism were J. Al-Din al-Afghani and S. Qutb.

Even today we can see manifestations of Islamic radicalism. More precise specifications of today's Islamic radicalism have yet to be determined. But it is already known that its slogans are used not only to modernize regimes in Islamic countries, but also for propaganda purposes, for intimidation, pursuing completely different goals. We should understand that various geopolitical forces are using various tools, including the idea of Islamic radicalism.

In contrast to previous periods, integration and globalization are playing a significant role now. That's why today we should see beyond the internal goals and forces of Islamic radicalism. But external powers that want to use internal problems for their goals also should be considered in order to understand the many shades of today's Islamic radicalism.

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