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**GENDER ROLE ATTITUDES AND RELIGIOSITY AMONG HIGHER
EDUCATION STUDENTS**

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Abstract: Besides demographic and social background determinants, religiosity is one of the most important factors which influence attitudes towards gender roles. In Europe, egalitarian gender roles have been aided by the eventual ubiquity of wide-ranging freedoms, women's increasing labour force participation in the post-socialist regions, the drastic decline in fertility, and state-sponsored secularisation. In this study, we examine Hungarian higher education students' views on gender roles using a nation-wide sample (N=1502, 2017). We create a typology with two modern attitude types beside the traditional view on gender roles, namely the pragmatic-instrumental and postmaterialist-postmodern types. We employ multinomial regression to analyse the factors which increase the likelihood of each type's occurrence. After accounting for the effect of demographic and social factors, we find that religiosity has a significant impact on the acceptance towards traditional gender roles. In addition, we also record the novel finding that respondents are much likelier to belong to the postmaterialist-postmodern type, which approves of women's labour force participation and favours the father's involvement in the family, if they are religious in the sense that they follow the teaching of a church.

Key words: gender role attitudes, religiosity, higher education, fatherhood.

1. Introduction

In this study, we examine higher education students' attitude towards gender roles, with special emphasis on its relationship with students' religiosity. Views on gender roles and division of labour within the family become worthy of investigation from a religious perspective when various cultures, nations, religions, and denominations intersect. The practices and rules of sharing responsibilities between genders in the family are also reflected at the societal level and exert their influence through workplaces, the system of social care, and the education system. The topic has become crucial for the functioning of a pluralistic society and intercultural coexistence. Additionally, since younger generations learn gender roles in the family, conflicts, even ones which threaten family cohesion, may arise from the way role structures are passed on, the challenges of a changing division of labour in society, as well as females' and males' divergent responses to these. In the study, we seek to answer the question about the role of religion and religiosity, as determinants besides established social and demographic factors, in the development of views on gender roles.

In the theoretical section of the study, we first describe higher education students' religiosity, then examine gender roles, gender role attitudes, as well as male and father roles, and finally explore the relationship between religiosity and gender role attitudes. Subsequently, based on the literature, we formulate five hypotheses about the connections between higher education students' gender role attitudes, social and demographic background variables, and religiosity. After presenting the database, the examined variables, and the employed methods, we analyse students' religiosity and gender role attitudes, then investigate the relationship between gender role attitudes and background variables, with particular regard to students' religiosity. In the discussion, we review our hypotheses, interpret the findings, and present our plans for further research.

2. Higher Education Students' Religiosity in the Region

In most of Europe, younger generations' religiosity is on the decline (Pollack and Rosta 2017). However, highly educated young people and university students in Hungary are more religious than the average (Pusztai 2015). One of the frameworks of interpretation, the modernisation-secularisation hypothesis argues that religion in modern societies declines with the expansion of education and remains popular only among low-status, marginalised groups (Pollack and Rosta 2017). In their research on the global transformations of religion in recent decades,

some diagnose multiple modernities and, in certain areas, a religiosity which increases with modernisation (Casanova 2018). These studies often consider Europe as the exception, where modernisation left many educated young people alienated from religion (Berger et al. 2008). Researchers from post-socialist countries have highlighted the denominational diversity and variety in religious transformations of the region (Zulehner et al. 2018). The area contains highly modernised and secularised societies (e.g., Czech Republic) as well as the most religious country in Europe (Romania). Before the fall of communism in Hungary, studies found declining institutional religiosity among well-educated people (Tomka 2011). In the past three decades, however, their religiosity has been gradually on the rise (Hámori and Rosta 2013). As for students, our research has found marked differences between regions. While children of low-status Eastern Hungarians and Hungarians in Romania used to be more religious, now there is a clear correlation between students' religiosity and their parents' high level of education, and an "upward" religious mobility can also be observed with high status (non-religious people's children often become religious) (Pusztai 2015, Pusztai and Demeter - Karászi 2019).

The other framework of interpretation which focuses on students' religiosity consists of the complex relations of embeddedness into social and academic environments in higher education. The literature of higher education research considers religious students to be at the risk of attrition, mainly due to their commitment to networks outside the institution (Sherkat 2006). Our findings in the region, both quantitative and qualitative, seem to challenge this idea (Pusztai 2015). We have highlighted, based on interviews in religious student networks, that the information flow, favours, and achievement-supporting norms in such networks can be considered resources. In quantitative analyses of student efficiency, we have revealed that connection to external communities which organise themselves on religious grounds helps students conduct their studies in a conscious and successful way. In our research, we have offered two explanations for the effect of religiosity on students' efficiency: first, direct, individual factors might be at play (goal orientation, work ethics, sense of duty, religious education and knowledge, the contribution of having read a lot, etc.); second, indirect influences may also be decisive (i.e., religious social capital incentivises high performance and limits norm-violating behaviour) (Pusztai 2015).

3. Gender Roles and Gender Role Attitudes

Despite unaltered biological and genetic differences, gender roles differ by culture, historical age, and social group. Mead (1949) has highlighted that gender behavioural patterns prevalent in developed

societies cannot be observed in some cultures (e.g., in certain tribes of the islands near New Guinea), which suggests that gender roles are phenomena which people learn during their socialisation. This is also evidenced by the wide evolution of gender roles throughout history, although biological and genetic differences have remained the same (Merton 1968). In hunting and gathering societies, females and males were equal partners as both genders had essential productive tasks. Furthermore, females and males took part in child-rearing equally. The phenomenon that “a woman’s place is in the home” and her tasks do not reach beyond child-rearing and housework is relatively new. The appearance of machines in industrialised societies often made female labour obsolete; the private and civic spheres split. Work and public life became male territories, breadwinning was men’s responsibility, while women remained in the private sphere to fulfil an emotional and supportive function (Parsons and Bales 1955). This division of responsibilities is nowadays referred to as the traditional role, although it was far from traditional in pre-industrialised societies.

With women having reappeared in the labour force and the number of male-only jobs on the decline in modern societies, a division of labour between genders is not inevitable. According to modern views on gender roles, individuals’ behaviour is not determined primarily by their gender anymore. As gender roles have become more symmetrical, certain countries have even witnessed the rise of female-breadwinner families (Blackstone 2003, Jurczyk et al. 2019).

Shifts in gender roles throughout the 20th century in developed countries can be traced back to the following: (1) the rise of modernisation and post-industrialist society, (2) women’s increasing participation in education and the labour force, (3) secularisation, and finally (4) female emancipation, individualisation, and the growing strength of feminist movements (Inglehart and Norris 2003, Scott 2006). However, the transformation of gender roles in developed countries has decelerated recently. What is more, conservative ideologies are on the rise, in a similar way to the acceptance of traditional gender roles. The inflow of women into education and the labour market has slowed down, while gender role attitudes have also evolved more slowly (Fortin 2005, Vella 1994).

Gender roles among young people can change more quickly than among older generations, yet it can still be observed that young people study and work in fields which correspond to traditional gender roles (Tinklin et al. 2005). In addition, certain researchers (Astin and Kent 1983, Astin 1977) argue that higher education institutions do little to diminish gender stereotypes. By contrast, Bryant (2003) has shown that years spent in higher education shift young people’s attitudes from traditional stances to more modern views; furthermore, modern considerations are reinforced by close connections with one’s peers, embeddedness into

campus life, participation in courses on women studies, and diversity experiences on campus.

In the communist era of Central and Eastern European countries, including Hungary, the dual-earner family model dominated, with the majority of women in full time employment. Despite this fact, data from Hungary collected between 1971 and 2001 show that most people identified with traditional gender roles, in which men are responsible for providing for the family, while women are tasked with emotional support and housework. It was also widely accepted that women must work to secure the family's livelihood (Pongráczné 2005). By 2011, a minor shift towards the acceptance of modern gender roles had occurred (Pongráczné and Molnár 2011). It has been revealed that young people's gender role attitudes, as opposed to Western countries, are similar to those of the adult population as traditional roles are widely accepted among them (Laki et al. 2008).

Nowadays, male and father roles are in transition as well. In most families, both genders must be the breadwinners simultaneously, while child-rearing and housework should also be done by both, at least in theory. Traditional role conflicts are often mentioned in connection with women (family or career), but male role conflicts are also on their way to become an important area of research. Most studies on male roles conflicts point to the fear of femininity and the difficulties of expressing emotions as primary causes (David and Brannon 1976, Farrell 1974, O'Neil 1981).

Besides male roles, transitions in father roles can also be investigated. Ostner's (2012) father role model is based on the intensity of the breadwinner role (strong, medium, weak). Lorentzen (2013) creates distinctions by the nature of father roles. In his terminology, "fathers for the family" provide for the family and create a secure livelihood, while "fathers in the family" take an active part in the family's life and focus on the children. It is Voltz (2007) who differentiates between traditional and modern father roles. The traditional father is the breadwinner, whereas the modern father considers emancipation a necessity and does his equal share of housework and child-rearing. Recently, fatherhood is also becoming a central part of men's success and self-realisation (Hobson 2002).

Spéder (2011) has found that the traditional breadwinning and decision-making father role is widely held in the Hungarian society, although participation in child-rearing is deemed similarly important. He found as well, that highly educated people are likelier to identify with modern father roles and women also share more modern views on fathers' responsibilities.

4. The Relationship between Gender Role Attitudes and Religiosity

The way genders are involved in the family and have access to participate in society varies internationally to a significant degree, which is better explained by religious factors than the economic and political characteristics of societies. Research on values has shown that secularised societies exhibit more frequently the view that gender roles are not so different (Inglehart and Norris 2003). According to one approach about the relationship between religion and gender roles, religion maintains the traditional division of roles as it legitimises inequalities between genders, reinforced, as critical feminists interpret it, by women's free housework and unconditional obedience or, as conservative interpretations go, by their exceptional spiritual and moral contribution to the sanctity of family life (Woodhead 2012, Zamfir 2018). But religiosity influences traditional, oppressive-patriarchal male roles in that it sensitises men to unfair, unequal division of labour within the family, makes them reevaluate their love relations, and creates a novel family-centricity in them. Similarly, embeddedness into religious organisations offers women a better opportunity to take on social responsibility (Wilcox 2004, Woodhead 2012).

Since the intensity of religiosity is complicated to measure and varies by denomination, most studies explore only the effect of denominational affiliation on family relations and gender role attitudes. According to Lenski (1961), Catholics in America were undereducated because of their traditional gender role attitudes and limited tolerance for women pursuing further. Subsequently, differences have been shown between the gender role attitudes of orthodox-fundamentalist Christian traditions and denominations which are open to modernity (Lehrer 2008). In the United States, men who belong to mainline Protestant denominations are more supportive of females' education and exhibit a more egalitarian attitude towards division of labour in the family (Wilcox calls them "new men"). By contrast, men of fundamentalist faith ("soft patriarchs") share a distinctly more family-centric ideology (Wilcox 2004). Although Wilcox does not examine Catholics, fertility statistics from multiconfessional regions of Europe unveil that women who belong to the Catholic Church or Orthodox Christianity follow a more traditional gender role model than their Protestant counterparts (Tisliar 2019).

According to Read (2003), gender role attitudes are determined by the intensity of religiosity to a greater extent than by religious-denominational affiliation. As for practices of division of housework in societies affected by migration, in Germany in particular, it has been found that deeply religious people (either German or Turkish) do not have overly egalitarian attitudes, but divisions by religiosity in everyday practices are greater among Turks than Germans (Diehl et al. 2009). Studies which examine females' decision to have children in the context of

religion have also shifted from the analysis of attitudes to the investigation of actual practices. It is clear that religious women have more children and, in parallel, take on a larger proportion of tasks which are difficult to substitute in the family than those who do not belong to a religious community (Tisliar 2019). In Hungary, religiosity is clearly associated with behaviour which corresponds to traditional gender roles; religious people raise more children, their marriages have greater stability (Pusztai 2016).

4. Research description

4.1. Hypotheses

In her analysis of data collected in 2010 from a cross-border region of three Central and Eastern European countries, Fényes (2014) has shown that almost half of higher education students view gender roles in a rather traditional way. Furthermore, she has revealed that males have a more traditional idea of gender roles than females. The effect of social background seems ambiguous: according to the study, parents' higher cultural capital increases the acceptance of modern attitudes (cultural reproduction), but an unfavourable financial situation could also strengthen modern attitudes (social mobility hypothesis). No attitude differences have been observed between students of urban and rural background. By contrast, the gender role attitudes of students who follow the teachings of a church are more traditional than those of students who are religious in their own way.

H1: Based on Fényes (2014), we hypothesise that religious students who have a close connection with their church have relatively traditional gender role attitudes, while those who are religious in their own way have rather modern views. However, this may be altered by the effect of social background variables if highly educated parents' children who follow the teachings of their church do not have more traditional gender role attitudes than their peers.

H2: Regarding the effects of denominational culture, based on Lenski (1961) and Lehrer (2008), we hypothesise that Catholics, who are socialised in strong commitment to the institution and with stricter norms on marriage (e.g., marriages cannot be broken up) inherit comparatively traditional gender role attitudes, while Protestants, who question the necessity of institutional (pastoral) mediation and are characterised by individualistic ideas, are more open to egalitarian gender role attitudes.

H3: Based on Fényes (2014), we also hypothesise that male higher education students have more traditional gender role attitudes than their female peers.

H4: Based on Fényes (2014), we presume that students whose parents have earned tertiary degrees have relatively modern views; at the same time, those in an unfavourable financial situation also have a modern

disposition (well-off people can afford the luxury of the woman staying at home while the man provides).

H5: Based on Fényes' (2014) findings, we hypothesise that students from a rural background do not have more traditional attitudes than their peers as they generally live in the town of the higher education institution during their studies.

4.2. Data, Methods, and Variables

In this study, we use the database from the Family and Career survey, which was conducted in 2017 at 11 Hungarian higher education institutions (Eötvös Loránd University, University of Óbuda, Semmelweis University, University of Debrecen, Debrecen Reformed Theological University, Eszterházy Károly University, University of Kaposvár, University of Nyíregyháza, University of Pécs, Széchenyi István University, University of Szeged). The sample of universities is representative with respect to institution size, region, and scientific discipline. An entire seminar group, selected at random, was surveyed at each university by discipline, which contributes to the randomised nature of the sample. The paper-based survey was carried out among full-time students (first-year students were excluded from the base population as they might not have developed clear ideas about the main questions in the survey). Of the 1600 survey sheets, 1502 were evaluated as valid.

The questionnaire items regarding female and mother roles, and women's labour force participation were taken from the statements which the European Values Study (EVS) and the International Social Survey Program (ISSP) contain about gender roles. Items about male and father roles correspond to the Family Values survey of the Hungarian Demographic Research Institute. The total scale consists of 25 items (the complete list is displayed in Table 1), with Cronbach's alpha at 0.77.

In the analysis, we use cluster analysis based on agreement or disagreement to gender roles (1-4 Likert scale), then conduct multinomial regression to reveal the relationship between clusters, social background variables, and indicators of religiosity. Religiosity is measured by two variables: respondents' denominational affiliation (Greek or Roman Catholic, Reformed Church, other denomination, or none) and religious self-identification (I follow the teachings of a church, I am religious in my own way, I do not know if I am religious or I am explicitly non-religious). The social background variables were: gender (female or male), objective financial situation index (the items were: if the respondents' family possessed own apartment, house, vacation home, recreational land, flat screen television, personal computer or laptop with internet broadband at home, tablet, e-book reader, mobile broadband, dishwasher, air conditioning, car). The subjective financial situation was measured by a scale (4: We have everything we need, we can afford significant expenditures (e.g., holiday), we can even save. 3: We have everything we

need but cannot afford significant expenditures. 2: Sometimes we cannot cover our everyday expenses. 1: Often we do not have enough money to cover everyday necessities). Finally we included the place of permanent residence (urban or rural), and the father's and mother's highest level of education (primary, secondary, or tertiary).

4.3. Findings

Concerning religiosity 15.8% of students follow the teachings of a church, 46.5% are religious in their own way and 37.7% cannot decide whether they are religious, or they are unambiguously non-religious. As for denominational affiliation, 582 respondents are Catholic (either Greek or Roman), 305 belong to the Reformed Church, 117 are affiliated with other denominations, and 239 are unaffiliated.

Table 1: Cluster centres of clusters created from gender role attitudes (attitudes were measured by Likert scale 1-4, the highest value in each row is highlighted grey)

	MOD1	TRAD	MOD2
Men's most important task is to provide for their family	2.77	3.37	3.26
To be a father and raise a child is the most beautiful experience in a man's life	3.22	3.21	3.71
It is not ridiculous for a father if people in his workplace find out that he changes the diapers	3.31	2.95	3.42
The most important goal in a man's life is to earn a lot of money	2.26	3.02	2.32
In general, fathers are as well suited to look after their children as mothers	3.19	2.79	3.09
A man has to have children in order to be fulfilled	2.66	3.03	3.42
One of the most important goals in a man's life is to achieve success in his career	2.60	3.09	2.63
It is more important for a man to spend more time with his family than to do extra work for additional income	2.94	3.05	3.24
The man should make the most important decisions in the family	1.88	3.19	2.54
Work is important but a home and children are more important to most women	2.27	3.27	3.24
Work should be more important for men than the family	1.46	2.57	1.51
A man's job is to earn money; a woman's job is to look after the home and family	1.83	3.21	2.54
Nowadays most women have to work for a secure livelihood	3.15	3.09	3.39
It is not for the relationship if the woman earns more than the man	1.90	3.12	2.52
Women do not have to ask for their partner's consent on how to spend their own earnings	3.03	2.92	2.50
Housework is worth as much as paid work	2.92	3.02	3.05
A job is alright but what most women really want is a home and children	2.15	3.16	3.15

Being a housewife is just as fulfilling as working for pay	2.56	3.02	3.13
Both the husband and wife should contribute to household income	3.56	3.25	3.57
It is not appropriate if the father stays at home with the child and the mother works	1.65	3.28	2.41
A working mother can establish just as warm and secure a relationship with her children as a mother who does not work	3.66	3.15	3.44
A pre-school child is likely to suffer if his or her mother works	1.98	3.20	2.88
All in all, family life suffers when the woman has a full-time job	1.72	3.16	2.59
The husband should earn more than the wife	1.52	2.98	2.40
Women's most important task is to raise children	1.68	3.01	2.93
N	356	604	475

K-means clustering, 100 iterations, missing pairwise

Concerning gender role attitudes, members of the first cluster (the pragmatic-instrumental modern group) prefer women's participation in the labour force, with signs of the emancipated working woman (a working mother can establish just as warm and secure a relationship with her children as a mother who does not work, women do not have to ask for their partner's consent on how to spend their own earnings). At the same time, however, women must take on family tasks, which results in doubled responsibility. In contrast to this, the father's breadwinning role dominates, although students in the cluster also agree that fathers are as well suited to look after their children as mothers. This view focuses on social and family responsibilities and commitments, considers differences and shared responsibilities, while reflecting a modern, pragmatic, instrumental approach. (MOD1: 356 people)

Students in the second (traditional) cluster accept women's labour force participation but have traditional attitudes in every other respect. The father's breadwinning function dominates, while the mother's main task remains housework and child-rearing. (TRAD: 604 people)

The third (postmaterialist-postmodern) cluster prefers women's labour force participation, while fatherhood and men's roles in the family are also important for them. The father is more than the breadwinner; both genders have shared roles. This cluster is arguably the most modern as its members prefer women's labour force participation and men's involvement in the family as fathers. Their view, which considers the family as a source of joy, resembles a postmodern, postmaterialist approach. (MOD2: 475 people)

Table 2: Results of multinomial logistic regression of cluster membership as dependent variable

	MOD1 VS TRAD Exp (B)	MOD2 VS TRAD Exp (B)	MOD2 VS MOD1 Exp (B)
gender=female (ref: male)	2.39***	1.63**	0.68
place of residence=rural (ref: urban)	1.55*	1.77**	1.14
fathered=primary (ref: tertiary)	0.67	1.02	1.51
fathered=secondary	0.73	1.02	1.39
mothered=primary (ref: tertiary)	0.82	0.83	1.02
mothered=secondary	0.86	0.64*	0.74
objfinancial=below average (ref: above average)	1.22	1.36	1.12
subjfinancial=below average (ref: above average)	0.7	0.66*	0.94
denomination=Catholic (ref: no denomination)	0.85	1.12	1.32
denomination=Reformed Church	0.46*	0.72	1.55
denomination=other denomination	0.6	0.51	0.85
religious self-identification=follows a church (ref: not religious, does not know)	0.26***	1.09	4.11***
religious self-identification=in their own way	0.35***	0.52**	1.51

We ran two regressions: the reference was the traditional group in one and the pragmatic-instrumental group in the other. Nagelkerke's R-squared = 0.167. The significance of Wald statistics is displayed next to Exp (B) values, where * marks significance between 0.01 and 0.05, ** marks significance between 0.001 and 0.01, and *** marks significance below 0.000.

Our results show that the likelihood of membership in the pragmatic-instrumental modern group over the traditional one is increased if an individual is female and has a rural background; while it is decreased if someone is religious in their own way, follows the teachings of a church, or belongs to the Reformed Church. The possibility of membership in the postmaterialist-postmodern group over the traditional group is higher if a person is female or has a rural background; while it is lower if the mother has only secondary education, the family is in a subjectively unfavourable financial situation, or someone is religious in their own way. Finally, religiosity through following the teachings of a church significantly elevates the likelihood of membership in the postmaterialist-postmodern group over the pragmatic-instrumental modern one.

5. Conclusions

The overview of studies in the literature leads us to conclude that modern societies have considerable diversity in religious traditions and the way people experience their religiosity, which also brings about variation in how open younger generations are to egalitarian gender role attitudes and behavioural patterns as opposed to traditional gender roles. Future graduates', that is, higher education students' attitudes and behaviour are of enormous importance. Analysing data from Hungary is especially topical because the proportion of higher education students and graduates with both church-centric and individualised religiosity is high. Furthermore, variants of the traditions of both the Catholic and Reformed Church can also be observed, even without institutional relationship or a profound belief in God (Tomka 2011).

In contrast with previous data (Fényes 2014), in which almost half of students exhibited traditional gender role attitudes, by 2017, only slightly more than a third of students can be categorised into the traditional cluster, which suggests a wider acceptance of modern roles. Since the previous survey was conducted in the Eastern regions of Hungary exclusively, whereas data were gathered throughout the whole country in 2017, it is plausible that the phenomenon is the effect of including students from relatively modern and well-off regions in Central and Western Hungary.

In our study, we performed a cluster analysis of gender role 25 variables (see Table 1), which resulted in the classification of the respondents into three clusters. The first cluster is called the pragmatic instrumental modern group (N = 356), as it includes students who prefer an equal distribution of social and household tasks (the man should participate in household tasks besides working, and the woman should work besides her traditional roles). Members of the second, traditional group (N = 604) agree with women's work, but all other attitudes strongly reflect traditional roles (e.g. the man is the main bread-winner, decision-maker, the woman's main task is child-rearing and household chores). The postmaterialist-postmodern group (N = 475) prefers a man in the family (actively involved in childcare and parenting, not just working for the family), and a woman's free choice between paid work and household chores.

The relationship between clusters and socio-demographic background variables was examined by multinomial logistic regression, with particular attention to items related to religiosity. The results of the regression are presented below along the hypotheses. As for religiosity (first hypothesis), traditional roles over pragmatic-instrumental modern attitudes are mostly accepted among those who are religious in their own way and those who follow the teachings of a church, even after taking social background variables into account. Along denominational lines

(second hypothesis), members of the Reformed Church are more likely to share the traditional view than members of other denominations, which is probably because a sizable proportion of students who belong to the Reformed Church grew up in Hungarian communities outside of Hungary, in a more traditional culture. According to our novel finding, however, church-centric religiosity raises the likelihood of membership in the postmaterialist-postmodern cluster significantly, which is characterised by the acceptance of women's labour force participation and the father's involvement in the family. This suggests that religious students do not always have traditional gender role attitudes, as evidenced by the fact that church-centric religiosity elevates the probability of membership in the most modern cluster, which focuses on the joys of fatherhood.

In accordance with the literature and the third hypothesis, we find that women are likelier to accept modern attitudes than men. In a novel finding, which partly contradicts the fifth hypothesis, we show that students from a rural background have more modern views on gender roles than their urban counterparts. This implies that young people from rural regions are not influenced anymore by traditional attitudes to a large extent as they are isolated from the aging local religious communities, and their gender role attitudes are shaped rather by the media.

With respect to the parents' education, the possibility of membership in the postmaterialist-postmodern group over the traditional group is lower if the mother has only secondary education, which is in accordance with the fourth hypothesis. An unfavourable subjective financial situation has the same effect, which, however, contradicts previous findings. A highly educated, affluent young person might be able to look beyond material necessities and experience the joys of postmaterialist values such as emotionally rich family relationships and parenthood.

Our subsequent research plans include the differentiation between disciplines and male-dominated or female-dominated faculties to examine gender roles deeper as well as the investigation of more complex connections between religiosity and gender role attitudes through qualitative interview methods.

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